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Discussion of ‘The pros and cons of regulating
corporate reporting: a critical review of the
arguments’
David Lindsell*
As I listened to the paper, in my capacity as
enforcer, which is a form of regulator, I was
wondering if I was the living embodiment of the
capture theory, on the basis that the Review Panel is
composed of chief financial officers, auditors and
lawyers, who collectively represent the regulated.
However, I have to say that most of the interactions
I have had with my customers would not lead me to
think that they think we are captive to them.
My comments on this paper take the form largely
of questions rather than answers. That, after all, is
consistent with my role as an enforcer. I am clearly
not an academic; I am a humble bean counter turned
enforcer.
The authors gave us a fascinating insight into
theories of regulation, summarising a good deal of
research relating to corporate reporting disclosure,
and then moving on to recent accounting regulatory
issues, particularly the fair value debate and the
political pressures that have arisen.
Their paper sets out to provide a framework
within which you might be able to evaluate some of
the pressures arising currently from the financial
crisis in terms of the impact on the regulation of
financial accounting, and isolating issues for further
research. That is an ambitious topic, and I found it a
bit difficult to see the connections between the
different parts, but I think it is a great enterprise to
undertake.
I think it is quite difficult to connect the theories
of regulation overall with disclosure regulation.
Maybe that is just as well because, after all, if the
capture theory – the theory, you may remember,
whereby the regulators are captured by the regu-
lated – is correct, then I would have thought the
policy implication is that government-backed
standard-setting should cease and standard-setting
should become a free market process again.
However much you might like that idea, it is clearly
pie in the sky, and, of course, it would put me out of
a job!
The paper discusses, under the heading ‘The case
for mandatory disclosure’, the market incentives to
disclose all available information in relation to
financial reporting. In that context it notes that there
is an inevitable resistance to disclosing proprietary
information effectively to competitors. However, in
financial reporting it is a much bigger, broader issue
than disclosure of proprietary information. It is
about balance in financial reporting.
If the incentives to disclose fully all relevant
information to the market were strong enough, we
in the UK would never have had the Cadbury report
in 1992, which said, ‘Boards should pay particular
attention to their duty to present a balanced and
understandable assessment of a company’s position.
Balance requires that setbacks should be dealt with
as well as successes.’ It is not just a question of
proprietary information, it is a question of a much
broader balance in disclosure.
The paper goes on to refer to the analysis by three
US academics under the heading ‘Regulation of
accounting standard-setting’ that focuses on the
ideology theory of regulation, which is an interest-
ing and attractive theory. This is, of course, where
regulators are seen as being endowed with political
ideologies and being subject to influence by pres-
sure groups (although seen as a positive influence
rather than having negative, bribery-type, connota-
tions).
The real trouble with that theory is that it does not
seem to me to get you very far because all it does is
acknowledge that the whole regulatory environment
in any territorymust depend upon the ideologies of a
particular regulator and the nature and extent of
lobbying activities directed at them. The theory
therefore makes no prediction about the optimality
of regulation, and so you start to wonder why the
theory is of any practical use. The authors of the
study do too, in a sense, because they acknowledge
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that it comes down to whether there are mechanisms
in the standard-setting process that minimise the
effect of idiosyncratic, very odd ideologies and
special-interest lobbying. And because an optimal
outcome cannot be guaranteed, their solution, as the
paper indicates, is to have competition amongst
standard-setters. But however nice this is in theory,
one cannot see now any realistic prospect of
competition between standard-setters.
It has become increasingly clear that the ideology
– I would say it is a theology – of fair value is
shared, as we have seen, by the international and the
US standard-setting priesthood. They are commit-
ted to developing a single universal bible of
accounting, and the two churches are dead set on
uniting. So the only way that you could ever see any
competition is through governmental action. Our
problem in the UK particularly is that the only way
there could realistically be competition now would
be if we had European standards. Very, very few
people in the UK want that. On the other hand, a lot
of people in the UK are very doubtful whether
convergence of international and US standards
could be achieved without importing the unattract-
ive rules-based mentality and adversarial enforce-
ment approach that characterises US financial
reporting. So there is no easy answer to this.
The paper moves on to discuss the increased
political involvement in standard-setting in the
wake of the financial crisis, and refers to the
demands made on the IASB and the FASB to relieve
some of the pressure on bank balance sheets that
was perceived to derive from fair value accounting.
The paper raises the possibility that the increased
discretion granted to financial institutions during
the crisis may have weakened market disciplinary
forces by reducing bank transparency and may have
increased the potential for opportunistic behaviour
by bank managements and may have allowed
essentially insolvent banks to continue operating.
It cites research that appears to confirm these
possibilities. However, I would say that in view of
the very fundamental changes that occurred in the
credit markets and their impact on asset valuation
methods and assumptions, any claim to be able to
produce reliable evidence of these types of outcome
at the moment must be regarded with considerable
scepticism.
As regards allowing insolvent banks to continue
operating, well of course, that is exactly what
happened – but we should not be surprised! History
tells us that this is typically what happens when a
crisis is potentially life-threatening to the system. It
happened in the secondary bank crisis at the end of
1973, although it was much smaller, in the sover-
eign debt crisis in the early 1980s, and of course the
collapse of Lloyd’s. What has happened in the
meantime since all those things happened may not
be so much an increase in the interventionism of
regulators as an increase in transparency that makes
it more difficult for regulators to make informal
arrangements to safeguard the system. This brings
me towards my one key point that I wouldmake, but
let us look at something else in the meantime.
The final part of the paper’s analysis discusses the
regulatory response in the US to pressure for
relaxation of the mark-to-market valuation rules,
on the basis that, as was widely argued by banks,
valuations were increasingly being depressed by
large liquidity risk premiums rather than default risk
premiums, and that this was causing what was
described as pro-cyclical deterioration in bank asset
prices or values.
The paper discusses in very practical terms the
benefits and the drawbacks of addressing what was
essentially a bank regulatory issue through the
accounting standard-setting process. The really
fundamental question is how the introduction into
accounting standards of recognition and measure-
ment rules that are required for prudential regulation
purposes, designed to promote financial stability –
how that importation can be reconciled with the
objective of preparing financial statements that
support the efficient allocation of capital by finan-
cial markets. And that is the big, $64,000 question,
which is why some of us think there should be a
clear separation between prudential regulation and
the regulation of publicly-reported financial state-
ments.
The paper rightly points out that in the aftermath
of the financial crisis, accounting standard-setting
has been subject to greater political pressure than
ever before. However, we should not be surprised
by this. If you take the UK as an example, history
shows that each significant change in the scope of
financial reporting and regulation in the UK has
been in response to spectacular corporate failures
and other financial scandals involving poor finan-
cial reporting. It was true of the Dearing Report in
1988, which resulted in the formation of the
Financial Reporting Council; the Cadbury report
in 1992, which introduced, of course, the first
corporate governance code with which companies
in the UK were expected to comply; and the post-
Enron initiatives such as the Higgs Report and the
setting up of the Professional Oversight Board.
It seems to me therefore, getting to my own
theme, that applying theories of regulation to
discrete episodes or events fails to recognise that
events are a product of their history. It seems to me
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necessary to study the history of financial reporting
regulation in order to understand the dynamics of
the regulatory response to developments and in
order to distinguish the main drivers of the system
from mere description.
I should like to close my comments with a
personal experience that demonstrates the import-
ance of understanding the history of issues when
trying to assess their current status. The paper refers
to the regulatory debate over fair value accounting
and proposals by the Financial Stability Forum as if
they were entirely a product of the financial crisis.
In fact, the financial crisis has merely enabled the
regulators to force the accounting standard-setters
to take on board some of the views that they, the
regulators, had been expressing, and the standard-
setters resisting, for some time.
I was a member of the Standards Advisory
Council of the IASB in June 2006, which was well
before the onset of the financial crisis – nobody
thought of any financial crisis at that stage –when a
Council member from the European Central Bank
with responsibilities for financial stability raised
five issues in relation to accounting standards. He
expressed concerns about these issues:
. first, the ‘own credit’ issue, that is recognising
liabilities at fair value;
. second, the conflict between accounting and risk
management in relation to bank demand deposits
and the inability under IAS 39 to use them for
interest rate hedging purposes, which, of course,
gave rise to the IAS 39 European carve-out that
was supposed to be temporary but has never been
resolved;
. third, the limitations of fair-value measurement
and its potential, as the ECB representative said, to
inject artificial volatility that degrades the infor-
mation value of prices and induces sub-optimal
real decisions;
. fourth, the incurred loss model of loan loss
provisioning, arguing as he did that the expected
loss model provides a more accurate representa-
tion of the fair value of the credit risk that a bank is
exposed to;
. and then finally, and least controversially, the
inadequacy of single-number reporting of valu-
ations and the need for information in accounts
that would more accurately reflect the distribution
of values in order to address better the reporting of
risk.
Do those issues sound familiar? Of course they do!
As I recall, in June 2006, IASBmembers lined up to
oppose all these points other than the last one.
However, it looks as though on all these issues the
IASB, which was so dismissive of them in 2006,
has now taken on board pretty well all the concerns
expressed by the central banker.
The point I wish to make is that it is only by
placing the present in the context of the past that we
are able to foresee the direction that the regulation
of corporate reportingmight take and to evaluate the
implications of possible future directions and to try
and stop some of the less desirable trends and
influences that might otherwise arise.
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